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ABSTRACT
Perspectives are an extremely important factor in political decisions. The study of
decision-making is often approached in a segmented manner with social scientists each
believing their discipline is the correct approach. This thesis asserts that the study of
decision-making must focus on how perspectives are formed and be interdisciplinary.
Each discipline should be incorporated to discover how various factors influence the
decision-making process.
Perspectives are often confused with beliefs or ideas. This thesis defines perspectives
as a subjective approach to an objective reality. A large portion of various sections in the
thesis is devoted to examining concepts of subjective reality. It explores some of the
possible interrelationships of perceptual influences with the intent of better understanding
the decision-making process. The thesis presents several models which help explain the
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I . INTRODUCTION
The study of decision-making is often approached in a
segmented manner with social scientists each believing their
discipline is the correct approach. Psychologists and
psychiatrists want to psychoanalyze the decision-maker and
discover what dark secrets may be hidden in his or her mind.
Sociologists look at the decision-maker's social organization
and his or her interactive information processing. Game
theorists search for the "most relevant" information from
which they can develop "rational" models (as if rationality is
a universal trait of mankind) . Political scientists conduct
surveys or "re-fight the last war."
However, the study of decision-making must be
interdisciplinary. Each discipline should be incorporated to
discover how various factors influence the decision-making
process. To be successful, it is imperative for the student
to have some idea of the motivation behind human behavior. As
Holsti observed, "students of international politics and
foreign policy have not achieved consensus about the central
relevance or utility of research on the belief systems and
cognitive processes of foreign policy leaders." 1 It is not
1 Axelrod, Robert, ed. Structure of Decision, The
Cognitive Maps of Political Elites
,
(New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1976), 20.
enough to look for statistical correlations or to perform a
regression analysis and expect future decisions to "fit the
curve." That is, not if people learn by mistakes (or any
other event)
. This thesis looks at some of the factors which
influence the formation of perspectives, or mindsets, with the
intention of demonstrating the importance of integrating
various disciplines in the study of decision-making.
Long before Descartes' famous "I think, therefore I am,"
or Kant's conceptualization of cognitive schemata, man had
been on an incessant search to know himself. His search to
understand the "who," "what," and "why" of self first led him
to ponder metaphysics to explain irrationality. Next,
(deciding man is a rational being after all), he ascribed
"laws" to nature in an attempt to determine order in life.
Most recently, in what could be described as a combination of
metaphysics and science, man continued the search in what is
termed the "new physics" or quantum physics for answers to
these same questions. 2
The idea that man as a cultural being is bound by hidden
rules and is not master of his fate may come as a shock to
some--it has always been hard to accept. The one thing
that is quite clear, however, is that man is bound as long
2 Three excellent books in which the lay reader may
pursue this subject are: Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions
, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1976); Briggs, John and F. David Peat, Looking Glass
Universe: The Emerging Science of Wholeness
,
(New York: Simon
& Schuster, Inc., 1984); and Zohar, Danah, The Quantum Self:
Human Nature And Consciousness Defined By The New Physics ,
(New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1990) .
as he remains ignorant of the nature of the hidden
pathways culture provides for him. 3
What are these hidden rules and pathways to which Hall
refers? How do they fit into the overall scheme of the
decision-making process--the "big picture?" Perspectives are
extremely important in political decision-making.
Acknowledging that man is not always aware of the inner
motivations which form his perspectives, this thesis looks at
some of the subtle determinants of perspectives—and thus
ultimately looks at subtle determinants of decision as well.
Perspectives are often confused with beliefs or ideas.
Many empirical studies involving perspectives pertain to
visual experiments and optical illusions. Perspectives, as
used in this thesis, may be defined as a subjective approach
to objective reality. Perspectives are thus considered as:
(1) unique to the individual, and (2) having a transitory
nature due to the possibility of their changing with the
dynamics of the situation. Robert McNamara, referring to the
process of decision-making during crises, writes: "What may
look like a reckless gamble in more tranquil times might be
seen as a reasonable risk." 4
3 Hall, Edward T., The Silent Language ," (Garden city
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959), 144.
4 McNamara, Robert S., Blundering Into Disaster
Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age , (New York
Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1985), 114.
The way a person perceives a particular situation depends
on many factors, the least of which may actually be facts.
Selective awareness often causes one to see clearly facts
which are not there but may appear present due to expectations
and perceptions. These expectations and perceptions are built
upon experiences, prior partial knowledge regarding the
subject, culturally derived beliefs and ideas, etc.
This thesis explores some possible interrelationships of
perceptual influences with the intent of better understanding
the decision-making process. In so doing it investigates the
following five hypotheses:
• Reason and reality are concepts unique to each person and
probably change over time.
• Reason depends on the application of a person's
culture/customs to their epistemic development.
• Previously learned concepts greatly influence how people
perceive new stimuli and how people structure problems and
formulate solutions
.
• Culture helps to shape perceptions by setting attitudes
and beliefs.
• Decisions may be determined more by influences than by
information.
The first part of the thesis begins by presenting a two-
dimensional model of decision-making. This is followed by
looking at game theory with some of its inherent problems. As
it does this it discusses Subjective Expected Utility (SEU)
theory and whether "laws" are constants or merely points of
reference. After that is presented an expanded view of the
horizontal dimension of decision-making, along with an
introduction to the concepts of: knowledge, rationality, and
reality. This chapter differentiates between objectivity and
subjectivity in terms of reality. It hints at the concept of
cognitive schemata by showing that people structure artificial
order because they cannot comprehend chaos.
The next chapter explores whether reality should be
considered fact or fantasy. It does this by digging into the
concept of self. This chapter makes the claim that people are
basically egoistic and that this strongly determines what they
perceive as reality. It also shows that people will emulate
the people which they admire.
The chapter on history and ideas looks at history from two
different, but complementary, viewpoints. The traditional
viewpoint takes the form of historical analogies. The other
viewpoint that is looked at is that of psycho-history. The
point here is that culture evolves in a Darwinist "survival of
the fittest." Thus, a culture--in any given time period--will
accept /expect behavioral norms which perpetuate that
particular people. In so doing it shapes the outlook of its
people. This is sometimes viewed in terms of "degrees of
civilization." (For example, "civilized" people no longer
practice infanticide, etc)
.
This chapter also shows that certain ideas become
prominent during any particular time period. These ideas
further influence people's perspectives and, at times, are
accepted by some people as "universals, " or "natural laws,"
etc. In this way they have a strong bearing on a person's
perspectives
.
The chapter on national character and individual
personality combines and expands on the concepts presented in
the two previous chapters. It further develops the part which
culture plays in developing perspectives. The chapter
questions whether distinct societies develop a national
character, or psyche like a person develops a personality, or
are there, in fact, universal attributes of human nature.
The next chapter concerns the development of cognitive
constructs. As the previous chapter looked at the development
of personality, this chapter looks at attempts to isolate
uniformities that exist in human cognition and action, while
at the same time, demonstrating the diversities which make
people individuals. It asserts that information is always
tempered by our internal biases.
A person's values and beliefs may form the strongest
influences on his or her perspectives. The greatest bond of
such influences appear to be cemented when a person is
relatively young. In fact, Jesuit priests are accredited with
claiming that if they are given a child until the age of five,
then that person will be theirs for life. This section on
values and belief systems investigates theories of how these
concepts affect a person's perspectives.
The next chapter is about modeling the process of forming
perspectives. This chapter presents a descriptive model of
the perspective formation process which is closely aligned
with models of short-term and long-term memory. The model
builds on the Encapsulated Man theory using information
presented throughout the thesis. The intent is to bring
together the various concepts into the "big picture" of the
process of decision-making. The thesis was designed to
facilitate understanding the development of perspectives, and
thus ultimately the decision-making process. Likewise, the
model which is presented here is intended to help understand
the process leading to the decision, not to predict what
decision might be made.
II. DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING
Political decision-making exists simultaneously within two
dimensions. The conceptualization of this is shown in Figure
1. The vertical aspect pertains to the relative importance of
the decision. This plane ranges from the most important














Figure 1 Dimensions of Political
Decision-Making
.
who must make the decision and the amount of attention devoted
to it. Decisions which are considered "most important" are
ones for which the political leader would be historically-
viewed as personally responsible. Examples would certainly
include nonroutine situations such as initiating or
terminating wars, or other decisions involving possible loss
of life. Additionally, this area of the continuum could
include any decision which the leader feels he or she must
become personally involved.
While it is recognized that people in command are
responsible for the decisions of their subordinates, leaders
often entrust the authority for certain types of decisions to
lower levels of competence. This delegation of authority is
represented at infinite levels on the vertical continuum below
the area which the political leader reserves for him or
herself
.
Also embedded within the realm of decision-making is a
horizontal level ranging from logic and rationalism to
subjective emotionalism. This is the dimension of decision-
making with which this thesis is primarily concerned.
All other things being equal, it is generally possible to
predict the vertical level at which a decision will be made.
However, it is just as generally impossible to predict the
horizontal level at which political decisions will be made.
One cannot categorize political decision-making according to
its inherent nature. If this were possible, then it would be
equally probable to predict the actual decision because they
would all be consistently determined according to the rational
man concept
.
Herein lies the greatest fallacy of game theory. In an
attempt to maintain simplicity, game theorists assume rational
goal seeking and an ability to structure an actor's propensity
for risk taking as well as an ability to determine the actor's
level of emotional frustration. This part of the thesis looks
at game theory and examines some reasons for its failure to be
an effective tool for understanding the political decision-
making process. As it does this it discusses Subjective
Expected Utility (SEU) theory and whether "laws" are constants
or "points of reference." More will be said regarding the
horizontal dimension of decision-making in Section B.
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A. GAME THEORY
Modern game theory is considered to have begun in 1944
with the publication of The Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior 5 . World War Two, followed by decades of an ever
increasing recognition of the destructive power of nuclear
weapons, encouraged the development of game theory to
determine how leaders might act/react in risky situations.
Rather than as a purely predictive instrument, the widest
usage of game theory is for studying the process of decision-
making
.
The basis of game theory is the dual premises of
rationality and maximization of utility. 6 "It [game theory]
is concerned with rational ways of playing and this means only
one thing: to get as much as possible in terms of utilities." 7
Many crisis-related decisions, or decisions requiring
reaction, are based on judging the probability of an outcome
given some input . Some researchers have noted that these
types of decisions are not grounded in rationality. "The
s See von Neuman, John and Oskar Morgenstern, The Theory
of Games and Economic Behavior , (New York: Wiley, 1944) .
6 As this thesis is not a treatise on game theory it
necessitates excluding explanations of some of the more
obvious factors of game theory (as they apply to political
decisions) such as the need for two or more players, neither
of which can be "nature," and the indiscrimination of luck.
7 Rapoport, Anatol, Two- Person Game Theory, The
Essential Ideas , (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan
Press, 1966), 29.
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experimental results indicate that people systematically
violate the principles of rational decision making when
judging probabilities, making predictions or otherwise
attempting to cope with probabilistic tasks." 8 This thesis
will show that these premises are also the foundation for the
inaccuracies obtained from using game theory for predicting
how an opponent will make a risky decision.
A further complication of game theory is the insistence on
the assumptions of ceteris paribus and simplicity. The
principle of ceteris paribus (all other things being equal)
means to hold constant all variables except the one to be
examined to see what effect that particular variable
has on the others. Political decisions are not made in a
sterile laboratory where the environment is structured to fit
the experiment
.
Simplicity is important in game theory for achieving a
functional understanding of the model. "A mathematical model
is a tremendous simplification of what it represents." 9 In
fact, simplicity is the ground rule for all models. Since the
world is complex, game theorists postulate that one cannot
model the world, with all its variables inherent in decision
making. Models are kept simple in order to be easily





9 Axelrod, 1976, 58.
12
understood and to make errors and solutions clearer to detect.
"In short, if the essentials which are selected by game theory
are misleading or too narrow, at least they are so clear and
precise that one may specify with precision what they omit or
distort. nl °
Paradoxically, it is this very simplicity and elegance
which draws the most frequent criticism of game theory.
Critics often claim that the simplicity of formal modeling
cannot accurately reflect psychological or political realism.
People often lack clear goals, misperceive each other's
actions and intentions, and miscalculate what is in their
own best interest. Nations often send off unintended
signals and respond as much to internal political
necessities as to external systems of incentives. 11
1 . SEU Theory
Most types of games are based on Subjective Expected
Utility (SEU) theory. The basic assumptions of SEU theory
were mentioned earlier regarding actors making only rational
choices based on maximizing their expected utility. In game
theory all actors have perfect information available and
understand all alternatives and consequences. SEU actors
fully comprehend themselves, their desires, and motivations.
They have a well-defined cardinal utility function. This
10 Press, Charles and Alan Arian, Empathy and Ideology,
Aspects of Administrative Innovation
,
(Chicago: Rand McNally
Sc Company, 1966), 156.
11 Tetlock, Philip, et al, ed., Behavior, society and
Nuclear War: Vol I , (New York & Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1989), 364.
13
mythical person is referred to as rational man in behavioral
sciences and as economic man in economics.
Conceptually, the SEU model is a beautiful object
deserving a prominent place in Plato's heaven of ideas.
But vast difficulties make it impossible to employ it in
any literal way in making actual human decisions. 12
Tversky and Hahnemann 13 have conducted experiments using game
theory in situations involving risk and uncertainty. Their
observations have shown that human behavior does not perform
in accordance with SEU theory.
Tetlock indicates that researchers may draw the wrong
conclusions when making assumptions about a policy's
"underlying cognitive or affective process." He points out
that political statements and actions do not always represent
what they appear on the surface.
Thus, policymakers may appear to rely on simple rules of
thumb in drawing lessons from history, but they may
actually be working with a far more subtle and
sophisticated grasp of the situation. Policymakers may be
using simple historical arguments (such as 'no more
Munichs' or 'no more Vietnams') to rally support from
wavering political constituencies and to preempt potential
criticism from either the left or right. In a similar
vein, policymakers may not actually be unaware of value
trade-offs or of contradictory evidence but may find it
politically useful to refuse to acknowledge them. 14
12 Simon, Herbert, Reason in Human Affairs
,
(Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1983), 13.
13 Tversky, Amos and Daniel Hahnemann, "Judgement Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases," Science , 185: No. 4157
(27 Sep 1974) , 1124-1131.




Not knowing the correct motive underlying such assertions
complicates accurate gaming. The use of history will be
studied further in the chapter on History and Ideas.
Steven Kull, 15 psychologist turned political scientist,
conducted a study on the psychological processes involved in
US and Soviet defense policy making as it applies to nuclear
weapons. His methodology included extensive research and many
in-depth interviews with defense intellectuals, policy makers,
and high ranking military officers.
Kull found that even security motives are often overridden
by psychological factors. One rationale which he postulates
as a reason for a nuclear arms race between the US and USSR is
satisfying some psychological need. Kull found that in some
cases policies are seen as valuable because they fulfill
competitive desires for status and prestige, or fulfill the
inherent urge to be competitive. Though not the only
rationale Kull blames for an arms race, satisfying
psychological needs lacks the national security dimension and
dwells on emotional gratifications. "I think that for the
most part it is more accurate to say that security-oriented
cognitive functions [are] being unconsciously subverted by
emotion-oriented motives." 16
15 Kull, Steven, Minds At War, Nuclear Reality and the
Inner Conflicts of Defense Policymakers
,
(New York: Basic




Political decisions—including those as important as
nuclear war policy developed during the luxury of peacetime—
are not made using SEU theory. Such decisions are often
colored by psychological and cultural factors which may be
hidden from the decision-maker.
SEU theory has never been applied, and never can be
applied—with or without the largest computers— in the
real world. Yet one encounters many purported
applications in mathematical economics, statistics, and
management science. Examined more closely, these
applications retain the formal structure of SEU theory,
but substitute for the incredible decision problem
postulated in that theory either a highly abstracted
problem in a world simplified to a few equations and
variables, with the utility function and the joint
probability distributions of events assumed to be already
provided, or a microproblem referring to some tiny,
carefully defined and bounded situation carved out of a
larger real-world reality. 17
George looks at game theory in light of determining
strategies for facilitating cooperation. 18 In so doing, he
explains the limited applicability of game theory to foreign
policy decision-making. One reciprocating strategy which
George discusses is the strategy of " tit-for-tat " as used in
world famous game The Prisoner's Dilemma . 19 "The tit-for-tat
17 Simon, 1983, 14.
18 George, Alexander L., Philip J. Farley, and Alexander
Dalin, eds
.
, U.S. -Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements,
Failures, Lessons
,
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1988), 694-711.
19 As explained in the sources listed below, The
Prisoner's Dilemma is considered one of the foremost examples
of theoretic games due to its simplicity and flexibility to
fit different situations of conflict. The tit-for-tat
strategy has consistently beaten other strategies in an annual
international challenge to solve the game. For further
16
strategy may have internal validity within the structure of
the experimental game but, not surprisingly, serious questions
arise regarding the external validity of the theory if one
tries to employ it in more complex settings such as the
adversarial relations between nations." 20
One reason for the inapplicability of game theory to
foreign policy is that game participants have perfect
knowledge regarding possible outcomes of the moves they make.
The making of foreign policy is replete with uncertainty.
Another constraint with strategies of cooperation is that the
cooperation may turn into one-up-manship, or feuding. This,
in fact, is the basis of arms races.
Some game theorists object to the use of the word "game"
in game theory because of the connotation of frivolity.
Schelling suggests it be called a "theory of interdependent
decision." 21 Whatever utility that may be gained from game
theory is often lost by the researcher attributing causation
to the variables instead of correlation. Games may be
information regarding The Prisoner's Dilemma see: Axelrod,
Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation, (New York: Basic
Books , Inc
.
, 1984; Rapoport , 1966; and Rapoport, Anatol and
Albert Chammah, Prisoner's Dilemma, A Study in Conflict and
Cooperation , (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press,
1965)
.
20 George, 1988, 704
21 Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict
,
(London,
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 16.
17
interesting and fun to play, but they remain games, not
decision tools.
2. Laws--Or Points Of Reference?
Games have rules. The very structure of games often leads to
the availability of only a limited number of alternatives.
This structuring is known as "agenda setting" in
administrative sciences. Effective administrators know that
one way to manipulate a meeting is to set the agenda so only
particular topics can be discussed. Agenda setting inevitably
limits alternative decisions which could be otherwise made.
Game theorists justify their setting of rules and the
structuring of games on the premise of bounded rationality.
"When the supply of available 'objective' criteria is
incapable of yielding a complete set of rules, that is, when
the game is 'indeterminate,' norms of some sort must be
developed, mutually perceived, and accepted; patterns of
action and response have to be legitimized." 22 Viewed in its
proper context this statement simply means to structure the
game so one can only achieve certain results. If the results
are unpredictable (like in the real world) , then the game has
little or no utility. On the other hand, if the results are
predictable, then there is no reason for the game.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to include in a game
all factors which may be connected in the decision process.
22 Ibid., 168-169
Game theorists claim to isolate the relevant factors, and then
they add the assumption that these factors (and only these
factors) will be pertinent to all rational people, in all
times, and for all situations in which the game may be
employed. Doing this puts artificial boundaries on
rationality, restricts the possible decisions, and is
unrealistic
.
There are no laws which are pertinent to all people in all
times. Even "laws" of physics and mathematics merely reflect
human understanding during a particular period of time and may
be relevant only in certain situations. Such "laws" are a
point of reference upon which we expand (and sometimes limit)
our knowledge. (In later sections the "point of reference"
theme will be expanded and brought to focus on how it pertains
to the development of perspectives).
Consider for a moment how belief in the "law" that the sun
revolved around a flat earth was an acceptable point of
reference for centuries. This may seem a bizarre example, but
mankind was able to operate within its constraints as if it
were actually true. These "scientific laws" tainted mankind'
s
perspectives in all facets of life as he tried to fit the
world into the model he was able to understand.
Consider the more modern examples of absolute space and
time. Aristotle believed that space was absolute and objects
existed in absolute space in their preferred state of rest
until acted upon. He gave the earth as his point of
19
reference. Newton's "laws" proved there is no unique or
preferred state of rest, thus no absolute space.
Newton did agree with Aristotle that time is absolute.
They both believed that any particular interval in time would
be measured the same regardless who performed the measurements
or where the measurements were performed. Einstein's theory
of relativity proved this to be incorrect as well. Time
depends on the point of reference, thus a twin who returned to
Earth after a long space journey would not have aged as
rapidly as the sibling who remained at home.
Newton's laws of motion put an end to the idea of absolute
position in space. The theory of relativity gets rid of
absolute time. 23
Having said all that, it is important to note that if
space and time are not absolutes then it is ludicrous to
consider human behavior in terms of constancy. Mankind may be
able to operate with some degree of sufficiency within such a
self -limiting model, but its designers should be warned not to
sail too near to the edge of the earth.
It is time, however, that we began to realize that much of
what passes for science today may have been scientific
yesterday but can no longer qualify because it does not
make any additional meaningful statements about anything.
It blindly adheres to procedures as a church adheres to
its ritual. 24
23 Hawking, Steven, A Brief History Of Time, From The Big
Bang To Black Holes, (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), 33.
24 Hall, 1959, 116.
20
Game theory deals with how people are expected to conduct
themselves in situations of conflict, not with how they
actually conduct themselves. It is founded on the concept of
rationality. Rationality equates to consistency in human
behavior. Game theory is unable to cope with inconsistencies
in behavior.
Game theory, as it was formulated by mathematicians, is
not equipped to deal with these matters, because there is
no room in that theory for the psychological make-up of
the participants. To the extent that psychological
matters are allowed to enter a theory of conflict, the
theory ceases to be a model of rational conf lict . . . .The
theory would become a behavioral theory, and real behavior
can never be explained on the basis of concepts of
"rationality" alone. 2S
Perhaps the greatest utility of game theory can be achieved if
one remembers that it is not reality which is being modeled,
but it is the researcher's assumptions based on expected
conditions
.
The "reason" in someone's action is important for
understanding that action. Questions of "why" and "how" must
be considered along with the "what" of decisions. This thesis
expounds the theory that everything which happens to a person,
a people, a nation, etc., is connected or influenced by all
that has happened before to that person, people, or nation,
etc. The influences may be subtle or indirectly connected,
but they are there and thus cannot be totally dismissed. We,
25 Rapoport, 1966, 209
21
both individually and collectively as communities or nations,
are products of all that has gone before, as well as the
events and interaction of the present, and of our beliefs,
fears, and aspirations for the future. This is the manner in
which we mold the future.
Earlier it was shown that the horizontal level of
decision-making ranged from subjective emotionalism to logic
and reason. It is time to take off the "blinders" and see the
"big picture." In order to do this one must investigate the
subtle influences which exist on the horizontal level of
decision-making. The next Section looks at several factors
involved, but often neglected, in the study of decision-
making. Volumes would be required to properly fit the expanse
of information available, therefore it was necessary to
include only some of the more prominent factors involved in
decision-making, and to exclude many supportive examples.
Section B expands the view of the horizontal dimension of
decision-making and introduces the concepts of: knowledge,
rationality, and reality. This section differentiates between
objectivity and subjectivity in terms of reality. It also
hints at the concept of cognitive schemata by showing that




B. THE HORIZONTAL LEVEL OF DECISION-MAKING
Science, like art, religion, commerce, warfare,
and even sleep, is based on presuppositions .
--Gregory Bateson
By education most have been misled;
So they believe, because they so were bred.
--John Dryden, The Hind and the Panther
Consider the scenario of a nearsighted person attempting
to read a sign from a distance. At first the letters may be
blurred and difficult to distinguish. As concentration is
increased the mind tries to analyze the context in which the
sign is presented, the length of the words on the sign, and
the positions of any distinguishable letters. At some point
a degree of recognition and sense is accomplished and finally
the previously blurry letters become clearer. It may seem
that the concentration increased the clarity of the eyesight.
However, closer inspection sometimes reveals inaccuracies in
the person's interpretation of what he or she saw and read.
The reason for this is because the mind compares input stimuli
with data it has stored in short-term memory (context, etc)
and long-term memory (similar experiences giving rise to
expectations and perceptions, etc). Some words are similar
to others in pattern association (length, letter grouping,
etc)
,
and in the above scenario, one may eventually "clearly"
see a word that is different from the actual word present.
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This is analogous to the decision-making process. When
gathering evidence, one may "clearly" see facts which are not
there but which appear to be present due to expectations and
perceptions
.
Selective awareness is a problem for us all. We filter
our awarenesses unconsciously, so that the data of which
we are aware is often incomplete and skewed. 26
These expectations and perceptions may be built upon
experiences, prior partial knowledge regarding the subject,
culturally derived beliefs, and ideas, etc. The horizontal
dimension of strategic planning ranges from logic and
rationalism to subjective emotionalism. Figure 2 is a partial
recreation of the model of political decision-making which was
presented in Figure 1. The diagram represents the horizontal
dimension discussed here.
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Figure 2 Horizontal Dimension of Decision-Making
26 Pneuman, Roy and Margaret Bruehl, Managing Conflict ,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982), 13.
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It was shown earlier in the thesis that political leaders
seldom, if ever, operate totally under the auspices of
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory. It was also shown
that important international issues are at times decided on
the psychological and emotional needs of the decision-maker.
This part of the thesis will look at some of the variables of
the horizontal level of political decision-making and
particularly at how they may alter the decision-maker's
perspectives
.
1. KNOWLEDGE, RATIONALITY, AND REALITY
Each of the above topics are singularly broad in scope,
though volumes would not do justice only a few paragraphs will
be allotted here. In a manner typified by Western
philosophers, reality is usually considered in terms of being
either subjective or objective. It is not the intent of this
thesis to delve into the philosophic issues of reality.
However, it is necessary to acknowledge the two trends of
thought
.
The subjectivistic view of reality is highly influenced,
if not constructed, by the person perceiving it. Thus,
reality is unique to the individual. "Information in this
view is not emergent from a real objective world and then
extracted; it is constructed by the person." 27 This is best
27 West, Charles, The Social and Psychological Distortion
of Information
, (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981), 8.
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epitomized by the encoding-decoding theory of interpersonal
communications. Briefly stated, this theory says that the
receiver never receives pure information from the sender. In
the process of communication the "pure" information is encoded
by the sender, and then decoded by the receiver. This
encoding and decoding is accomplished through language,
perceptions, culture, etc. In the subjectivistic view, this
decoding is extended to all external inputs, not just human
communication. To the subject ivist something is always lost or
altered in the translation. (The chapter on reality will
contain more on the mechanics of this process)
.
The objectivistic view is quite different from the
subjectivistic one. It believes in truth existing as pure
information, knowledge, or fact. In this view there is
nothing hidden anywhere, it is all just waiting to be found.
"In the objectivistic view, information is embedded in the
world and extracted from the world." 28 To the objectivist,
knowledge is information and can be accurately communicated as
undistorted truth.
Somewhere in between the subjective and objective views of
reality is subjectivistic relativism. In this view it is not
the subject nor the object which is important. Though both





In the relativistic view, an item of information
derives its status and its existence from its
relationship to the person and from its relationship
to all other information. When we look at one event
we find it connected to every other aspect of the
universe. It is impossible to know an object in its
own right. We know it in its inter-relatedness to
other objects and to us. 29
Philosophy is not the only discipline to which
subjectivistic relativism applies. It perhaps received its
greatest notoriety in physics with Einstien's theory of
relativity. The publication of this theory, along with
Heisenberg's theory of quantum mechanics, led Karl Popper to
conclude that: "The empirical basis of objective science has
thus nothing 'absolute' about it." 30
Thomas Kuhn, a physicist/historian, alluded to how
perspectives alter scientific theories in his The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions . 31 Throughout it he proved that the
observer and the object being observed are intrinsically
interrelated. "Kuhn has shown us that in science the...
experimenter and experiment, are somehow one movement." 32
Before leaving the tenets of physical science and
returning to social science another aspect of interrelatedness
bears mentioning. Working with details of the correlation
29 Ibid., 11
30 Popper, Karl R., The Logic of Scientific Discovery ,
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959), 111.
31 See: Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions
, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).
32 Briggs and Peat, 1984, 34.
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between paired particles, developed by J. S. Bell, the French
physicist Alain Aspect experimented with split photons. Two
correlated split photons (A and B) were fired in opposite
directions and while they were still in flight a polarizing
filter was put in front of photon A. "The results showed that
the photon twin at B seemed to 'know' what had happened to the
twin at A. " 33
The possible existence of objective reality is not denied,
however such debates are best left to philosophers. Exploring
the process of political decision-making must entail a
subjective approach to reality because it is more important to
consider how people perceive abstract concepts than how the
concepts really are. An example of the importance of this
concept is the fear of nuclear first-strike vulnerability
coupled with misperceptions of an opponent's intentions.
So I repeat: U.S. and USSR reciprocal fears of first-
strike vulnerability persist. They are real. And, in a
crisis, it matters what the other side believes--not what
is objectively true. 34
Objective reality is more important to someone seeking
truth, which is not necessarily congruent with seeking
knowledge or understanding. There may be absolute knowledge,
truth, etc. as the objectivists argue, but when dealing with
the tangibility of human decision-making it is more important
to consider how people perceive such abstracts than how they
33 Ibid., 88.
34 McNamara, 1986, 51-52
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really are. Therefore this thesis will maintain a subjective
approach to reality.
Reality is the application of reason. Reason depends on
the application of a person's culture/customs to their
epistemic development. Therefore, both reason and reality are
concepts unique to each individual (although the observed
degree of variance among individuals may be minuscule) and may
(i.e. probably) change over time. Royce grouped questions of
how knowledge effects perceptions together with questions of
reality and meaning.
Because what and how we know lie behind our world views
and because 'epistemic styles' are key manifestations of
what we are....[T]he major point being that men of
differing world views reflect limited or encapsulated




The fact that people are different is generally agreed upon,
it is the degree of difference which is arguable. Later
chapters will focus on how differences in perspectives are
formed, and whether traits exist universally across cultures.
2. STRUCTURING ORDER OUT OF CHAOS
Rationality generally equates to the predictability which
follows convention. If someone behaves in a manner which is
considered by society to follow a form of Subjective Expected
Utility (SEU) theory, (see section A for more on SEU theory)
Royce, quoted in Carterette, Edward and Morton
Friedman, ed., Handbook of Perception Vol I: Historical and
Philosophical Roots of Perception
,
(New York and London:
Academic Press, 1974), 150.
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then that person is said to behave in a rational manner.
Usually this equates to the person behaving in a manner in
which we would have if we were the actor involved.
Perhaps one of our greatest collective faults as
individuals is the tendency to assume that the way we see
things is the way they are and also the same way others
see things. Yet... it is easy to recognize that no two
persons can perceive reality in an identical way.... The
potential for misperception and conflict should be readily
apparent , 36
The popular term for assuming other people see things the
same way we do is "mirror imaging." We expect the other
person to have the same desires and motivations as we do.
Thus, they should act/react as we would in a given situation.
To say something has meaning implies the use of intellect,
the use of intellect implies reasoning (either past and/or
present), reasoning requires some point of reference. It is
natural for one's point of reference to be one's own self. We
relate situations to our experiences or to our understanding
of other's experiences. "The idea of the frame of reference
is only a convenient way of attempting to represent a person's
history, experiences, leanings, needs, and in a sense,
aspirations . " 37
In a manner of speaking one could say that yesterday is
never really gone, and there is no present. In our minds we
dwell in the past, regardless of whether we project (or think
36 Pneuman and Bruehl, 1982, 25
37 West, 1981, 21.
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that we project) that past into the present or future. We
continually try to recreate or correct past events using
current or contrived future situations. No new situation is
approached taJbula rasa. Our minds are constantly comparing
new stimuli with past events. We structure artificial order
because we cannot comprehend chaos. Yet, defining the problem
puts constraints on the possible solutions.
Still, it is always possible that the style of thought
and conceptualization of particular problems may act as
blinders. By directing the focus in a particular way,
important aspects of decision-making are blocked off. 38
Often this is accomplished without our conscious
awareness. William James said that when reading or listening,
much of what we think we see or hear is not sensory input but
actually supplied from our memory. Anthropologist\Philosopher
Gregory Bateson tells us: "All experience is subjective, . . .our
brains make the images that we think we 'perceive'." 39
Man is not alone in having perceptions determined
subjectively. Primitive cultures seem to integrate themselves
more fully with their environment than does "modern" man.
However, Reuben Abel shows that every organism is basically
egoistic and its world revolves around its sensory awareness.
Sense awareness varies among species. Some animals have
sensory avenues that humans lack, such as sensitivity to
radio waves and to magnetic fields. Certain fish emit
38 Press and Arian, 1966, 156
39 Bateson, Greogory, Mind and Nature, A Necessary Unity ,
(New York: E.P. Dutton, 1979), 35.
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electrical impulses and sense their surroundings by the
deformation of electric fields. Some birds sense changes
in barometric pressure and polarized light. Thus every
organism lives in the world shaped for it by its sensory
apparatus . 40
An argument could be made that, effectively, each specie
lives in its own world, shaped by its perception of its
environment. This is how man developed the perception that he
is the center of the world. Through such perceptions man has'
made himself the center of his world. "It is in the form of
percepts that man grasps the evidence of his senses and
apprehends reality." 41
This does not imply that true reality exists only as man
perceives it. What is said here is that man's most basic
motivational force is himself and everything he does is
somehow related to that force. Man's world revolves around
man. This is just as relevant on an ecological level as it is
on a personal level.
Hans Morgenthau's epic Politics Among Nations explains
that personal perspectives play an important role in political
realism. He states that no person can be characterized as one
type or another, but rather as a composite of several types
which he terms "economic man," "religious man," "moral man,"
"political man," etc. "Political realism is based upon a
40 Abel, Reuben, Man Is The Measure
,
(New York:
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1976), 29.
41 Rand, Ayn, Introduction To Objectivist Epistemolocry ,
(New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1966), 5-10.
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pluralistic conception of human nature." 42 How these
different types may come together in the formation of an
individual's perspectives is a primary concern of this thesis.
In an attempt to construct order, man often loses touch
with the "big picture." Each person's functional reality is
merely a microcosm representing his or her perception of
reality.
In demonstrating how experience and knowledge have a
primary role in establishing expectations and perceptions,
West reports on several experiments regarding how people
interpret stimuli. 43 Along with other researchers, West
found that a "person's experience (including concepts) .. .has
an impact on the recognition of stimuli." 44 In one
experiment, the researcher presented different pictures in
each eye of a stereoscope to subjects from North America and
Mexico. In one eye was presented the picture of a baseball
player. In the other eye was a slide of a bullfighter. "Most
North Americans tested recognized the baseball player whereas
most Mexicans recognized the bullfighter." 45
In another experiment the researcher had people with
different backgrounds read the same prose passage and then
42 Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations , 5th ed.,
(Alfred Knopf, Inc., 1973), 14.
43 West, 1981, 21-36.
44 Ibid.
, 29.
45 Ibid. , 29.
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take multiple choice tests on the material read. Some of the
subjects had backgrounds in physical education and some in
music. The results indicated the backgrounds of the subjects
had a strong influence on their interpretations of the prose.
In yet another experiment West reported that the
researchers found evidence indicating that the way a person
organizes data (cognitive schema) influences perception and
recognition. "Their data indicate that when persons are
confronted with unfocused photographs and asked to identify
the object in the photograph as it is gradually focused, the
early hypotheses tend to interfere with later correct
identification." 46 This further indicates that cognitive
schemata influences the learning of new data (knowledge) and,
most importantly, problem solving and decisions-making.








This chapter began by introducing a model of political
decision-making in two dimensions. The model represented the
vertical dimension as the decision's range of importance. The
horizontal dimension stretched from subjective emotionalism to
logic and rationalism. The thesis is that most decisions fall
somewhere between the two extremes.
This was followed with Section A dealing largely with game
theory. The precepts of game theory lie on or near the far
end of the horizontal dimension which pertains to logic and
rationalism. Through reviewing the work of other researchers
it was noted that many crisis-related decisions, or decisions
requiring reaction, violate the principles of rationality.
Game theory's narrow focus and insistence on simplicity has
drawn much criticism pertaining to its ability to accurately
reflect psychological or political realism.
Another basic assumption of game theory was shown to be
that of actors making only rational choices based on
maximizing their expected utility. The subsection on
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) reported on experiments
conducted using game theory in situations involving risk and
uncertainty. Included in this subsection was a summary of a
study on the psychological processes involved in US and Soviet
defense policy-making as it applies to nuclear weapons. The
findings throughout were that human behavior does not perform
35
in accordance with SEU theory. This includes political
decisions as important as nuclear war policy.
The structure of games may easily lead to the availability
of only a limited number of alternative solutions. Game
theorists claim to isolate the relevant factors, and that only
these factors will be pertinent to all "rational" people, in
all times, and for all situations in which the game may be
employed. It was shown that doing this puts artificial
boundaries on rationality, restricts the possible decisions,
and is unrealistic.
Subsection 2 pointed out there are no laws which are
pertinent to all people in all times. It demonstrated that
even the "absolutes" of physical science have changed with
scientists' perception of reality. This thesis suggests that
such laws should not be considered as constants but as points
of reference from which to expand our knowledge and
understanding of ourselves and our environment. However, if
not viewed in their proper context, these points of reference
can limit as well as expand.
Section B gave an expanded view of the horizontal
dimension of political decision-making and focused on factors
influencing the formation of perspectives. Along the way it
introduced the concepts of: knowledge, rationality, and
reality; and differentiated between objectivity and
subjectivity in terms of reality. It decided debates
concerning objective reality are best left to philosophers.
36
The thesis strongly supports exploring the process of
political decision-making using an subjective approach to
reality.
How a person receives, perceives, stores and retrieves
knowledge has a great influence on his or her formation of
concepts, perceptions, and ultimately, decisions.
"Psychological research supports the thesis that our knowledge
strongly influences how we perceive new stimuli and construct
new information." 47 No new situation is approached tabula
rasa. Our minds apparently organizes data in a manner with
which it can compare new information. The thesis suggests the
concept of cognitive schemata by showing that people structure
artificial order because they cannot comprehend chaos. This
artificial order, or functional reality, is a microcosm of






III. REALITY--FACT OR FANTASY?
In chapter II it was shown there no universal "laws" which
are pertinent to all people in all times. That section
illustrated how even "laws" of physics and mathematics may
only reflect a transitory human understanding. As such they
serve as a point of reference for expanding or sometimes
limiting our knowledge. But, if there are no universal laws,
no constants throughout time, then what is the thing we
interact with daily which we refer to as reality? Is this
reality fact or fantasy?
Chapter II also spoke of reality as the application of
reason. It further explained that reason depends on the
application of culture and custom to a person's epistemic
development. If that is true, then it is easy to see that
reality is a concept that is subjective. It is unique to each
individual. This chapter continues the theme of subjective
reality as applied to the concept of self.
A. THE SELF-CONCEPT
Each person sees themself not as a person, but as a
"symbolic self" 48 This symbolic self, or self -concept , helps
determine the behavior of the individual. If a male typifies
himself as a "John Wayne" or a "Rambo, " then his behavior will
exhibit the attributes which he sees portrayed by that
particular character. Likewise a person may approach a
situation with the conscious thought of how someone like Jesus
Christ or Gandhi would react in that given situation. "What
we admire, we emulate." 49 Such emulation is an attempt to
more closely align the admirer's self -concept with the
symbol (s) of their role-model. In effect, they are trying to
become that person--or more accurately stated, their
perception of the person.
As an example, consider why someone might persistently
expound the virtues of freedom, justice, equality and
democracy with the unending zeal of a fundamentalist preacher.
It may well be that this person believes in these ideals as
objective truths of which it is his or her duty to crusade. If
so, then perhaps the crusade causes the person to see themself
symbolically as some combination of Plato, Patrick Henry,
Adams, Hamilton, Madison and Jefferson, etc.
48 Hayakawa, S. I. Symbol, Status, and Personality , (New
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1958), 36-50.
49 Ibid. 45
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Or it may be that this person admired whatever qualities
he or she saw in these people. If this is the motivation,
then in trying to emulate them (symbolically become them) , he
or she may be acting out the part which the role-model (s) may
have played had they been presented the situation. Doing so
would provide justification for the particular self -concept
.
Even so, the part played would represent the symbol of the
role-model (s) not the actual person (s).
Another possible reason for such a crusade may be to
justify sanctioning taboos which were learned early in the
individual's social development. This may be especially valid
if the taboos are incongruent with the concepts expressed, and
if such taboos may be more socially acceptable now than when
they were first learned.
However the "process" may have begun, it develops into a
self -perpetuating cycle or tautology, with one "process"
feeding the other. In this way the concepts become internally
strengthened. They also become more resistent to change and
a more powerful influence on perspectives.
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B. ENCAPSULATED MAN/LIFE SPACE THEORY
Borrowing from Royce 50 this thesis terms subjective
perceptual-reality the "Encapsulated Man Theory." This theory
is also related to the theory of Life Space, 51 however,
Royce's term is more appropriate to the present work.
Perspectives are encapsulated in an illusion created by
one's beliefs and culture. Enclosed within this illusion, or
"transparent bubble," 52 is one's self -perception, or
"symbolic self" 53 This self -perception, or Self, is
developed through the influences of genetics and the
individual's experiences in life. But, more than just the
experiences, it is important to note that how one responds to
those experiences helps to shape the Self.
Outside of the Self, but still within each individual's
"bubble" of life space, is one's perception of reality. This
concept is formed by one's perspectives of other people and by
interacting with them and their perceived reality. "Our
perceptions of other people, of how they relate to one another
Royce, Joseph, The Encapsulated Man: An
Interdisciplinary Essay On The Search For Meaning
,
(Princeton:
Van Nostrand-Reinhold, 1964) .
51 Baumgartel, Howard, Notes on the Concept of the Life
Space
,
(Lawrence: Kansas University, 1958), and Pneuman and
Bruehl, 1982, 23-31.
52 Pneuman and Bruehl, 1982, 23.
53 Hayakawa, 1958, 36.
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and to their world, and of how they relate to us, the
perceivers, constitute our 'perceived' reality." 54 This is
how people make sense of their social reality. It is this
combination of Self and perceived reality which form the basis
of the Encapsulated Man theory. The representation of this is
shown in Figure 3 .
Each person operates within the confines of the illusion which
they have created for themselves. (The term "self -created" is
used here to emphasize that each person has a will of their







Figure 3 Encapsulated Man Theory
54 Pneuman and Bruehl , 1982, 23-25
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This is analogous to the section in chapter II which
demonstrated that each specie in nature lives in the world
which is uniquely shaped for it by its senses. It bears
repeating here that this is how man developed the perception
that he is the center of the world. Each person's "reality"
is shaped by their own personal experiences and their
perception of how other people and objects relate to them.
"Each of us sees, then, not the reality that exists without
the bubble, but a caricature or distorted picture of
reality." 55 This is in agreement with the ancient Greek
philosopher, Protagoras, when he claimed that man is the
measure of all things.
William Shakespeare once compared mankind's social
interactions to actors on a stage with each person playing out
their role. If one's perspective of reality is tempered
through the egoistic nature as presented in the Encapsulated
Man theory, then each person must see themself , not JUST as an
actor, but as THE leading man or woman. It is not the
importance of the actor that is different, but the
individual's perception of the role that is cast. In this
light, each individual sees every other person as supporting
actors. The current "play" being performed (in the mind of
the individual) may call for a humble servant of mankind or
the "script" may involve a figure destined for greatness.
55 Ibid., 25.
43
Speaking metaphorically, the shape of the bubble acts like
a prism. It filters external events (objective reality?) into
internal perspectives. It is important to note that the
shape, or form, of one's illusionary bubble of reality will
change somewhat throughout one's life. It appears though,
that the dominant influences relate to one's values and belief
systems. (See chapter VII). As long as these remain fairly
constant, Then the shape of the bubble will not be drastically
altered.
The concept of subjective reality may not be readily
accepted by all people. There is a tendency for people to
believe that they perceive things objectively. They think
that they see things the way they really are. Since it is the
way things are, then others must see them the same way.
Yet, according to the concept of Life Space, it is easy to
recognize that no two persons can perceive reality in an
identical way. It is apparent that our perceptions of
reality are inherently subjective, and that the data
entering our consciousness is, therefore, different for
each of us. As a result, each of us responds not to
reality, but to a different distortion of reality. The
potential for misperception and conflict should be readily
apparent . 56
To be effective in understanding someone's motives one
must be able to empathize and understand the other person's
perception of the issues. This is particularly relevant when
considering decision-making in international politics.
"Misattributing motives and intentions is a central thread
56 Ibid., 25
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that potentially runs through all international relations
calculations . " S7
When determining someone's reasoning, people generally
will see what they want to see, and having reached a
conclusion they will try to justify it. "We see what we want
to see, and the more we see it, the more likely we are to
reinforce this distorted perception." 58 As has been shown
here, such conclusions are based on subjective concepts of
reality. Each individual's concept of reality is uniquely
tempered by their life experiences and perceptions of others.
57 Fisher, 1988, 33-34
S8
. Weinberg, Harry, Levels of Knowing and Existence:




The chapter began by continuing the theme of subjective
reality as it applies to the concept of Self. It observed
that each person sees themself as a "symbolic self." This
symbolic self, or self -concept , helps determine the behavior
of the individual. When one emulates someone they admire, it
is an attempt to more closely align the admirer's self-concept
with the symbolic Self of their role-model.
An example was given of how some people persistently
exhort, or otherwise strongly exhibit, ideals to the point of
perhaps appearing to wear them like a cloak of righteousness.
Three possible reasons were presented for such crusading
action. One reason was that he or she may believe in these
ideals as objective truths existing somewhere in Plato's
heaven of ideas, or as lofty prizes to be won.
Another possible reason for the type of action depicted in
the above example may be an attempt to emulate some person or
persons which displayed admirable qualities. Doing so was
described as an endeavor to symbolically become the admired
person. This would cause them to act out the part the way
they believe the particular role-model would in a similar
situation
.
As a society changes, so do the behavioral norms which it
expects and accepts. The third reason for the behavior in the
given example may be to justify the sanctioning of taboos
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which were learned early in the individual's social
development. It was asserted that this may be especially
valid if the taboos are more socially acceptable now than when
they were first learned.
Section A concluded that regardless of the motivation, the
process develops into a self -perpetuating cycle, thus
internally strengthening the concepts. This also causes the
concepts to become more resistent to change and a more
powerful influence on perspectives.
Section B developed earlier presented concepts into what
it refers to as the "Encapsulated Man Theory." This theory
claims that perspectives are encapsulated in an illusion
created by one's beliefs and culture. Within this "bubble" is
one's self -perception, or Self, as well as one's perception of
reality. Influences of both concepts include: genetics,
perceptions of others, experiences, and how one responds to
those experiences
.
A reason expressed for why some people may not readily
accept the concept of subjective reality was the tendency to
believe that they actually see things in an objective sense.
Then, through the process of mirror-imaging, they attribute
the same perspectives to other people. Yet it was shown that
no two people can perceive reality in an identical way.




IV. HISTORY and IDEAS
History implies a continuity of something more than
time. . . --Erich Kahler, Man The Measure .
Every shift in the course of events changes the bearing
of the past upon the present.
--S. P. Lamprecht, Nature and History
History affects perceptions in two important ways. One
way is how history is interpreted. Another way history
affects perspectives is through the culturally based
development of social standards and individual personalities.
The subject of history also holds relevance to the
formation of perspectives because it pertains to man's
relation to the world that surrounds him. Perspectives are
partially based on values, ideas and ideals which develop and
change over time. History records the events which mark these
changes. The "Encapsulated Man Theory" (see chapter III)
stated that how people differentiate themselves with their
surroundings determines their concepts of Self and reality.
"The differentiation of man's relation to the human community
develops the human individual." 59
This chapter looks at history from three different, but
complementary, viewpoints. The traditional viewpoint takes
the form of historical analogies. Often this is an endeavor
59 Kahler, Erich, Man the Measure: A New Approach To
History , (New York: George Brazeller, Inc., 1956), 19.
48
to overcome Santayana's warning to either learn from history
or repeat it.
Another view which is looked at is that of psychohistory
.
The concept here is that as culture evolves it will accept,
and indeed expect, behavioral norms which perpetuate that
particular people--during that particular period of time. In
so doing it helps to shape the sociological outlook of its
people.
Historicism is similar to psychohistory and is the third
view which is looked at. Historicism is the study of the
history of ideas in light of how the ideas a ffect events.
Certain ideas become prominent during any period of time.
These ideas further influence people's perspectives and, at




As shown later in the chapter on cognitive constructs,
historical analogies are based on inferences and amount to a
type of simplification strategy. It is an attempt to assign
order to disjunctive knowledge of events and intentions.
Doing so often results in action reminiscent of the cliche of
trying to fight the last war. Tetlock states that such
"cognitive economy and efficiency" is highly susceptible to
error. "Reliance on simple historical analogies raises the
risk of overlooking important differences between one's
preferred precedent and the current problem (for example, the
Vietnam War differs in many respects from the diverse
contemporary conflicts to which it has frequently been
compared: El Salvador, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Lebanon,
Angola, Ethiopia, and Cambodia)." 60
As with most types of analogies, frequently historical
analogies are not grounded in fact. Instead they have their
base in emotion, and emotion has an unique way of clouding
one's perspectives. It causes a reluctance to modify
preconceptions when the facts present contrary evidence. This
may cause one to cling to incorrect assessments or fail to see
flaws in their policy.
60 Tetlock, et al . , 1989, 342
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When used in this manner, historical analogies may be more
of a justification for a policy rather than a motivation.
Historical analogies may be used to gain or thwart support for
some political or military action. This is represented by
sayings like "The war to end all wars, " and the "no more
Vietnams" syndrome.
Historical analogies play an important part when political
leaders try to determine the perspectives of their
counterparts. It is often more important to anticipate how
they are programmed to perceive issue at hand than the formal
substance of the issue itself. "While it may be important to
check the historical facts, knowing how that history is
remembered may be more to the point..." 61
Although the political motivation for using historical
analogies may have dubious origins, if the use is effective
the ends must be considered. The effective use of historical
analogies is an excellent way for bonding together members of
a group or nation and for developing attitudes regarding some
situation or event. "The attitudes men take toward historical
events may profoundly affect their expectations about the
future, thus sometimes influencing their actions." 62 The use
61 Fisher, Glen, Mindsets: The Role of Culture and
Perception in International Relations
,
(Yarmouth:
Intercultural Press, Inc., 1988), 4.
62 Deininger, Whitaker T., Problems in Social and
Political Thought: A Philosophical Introduction , New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1965), 324.
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of historical analogies is a search for continuity in
understanding. Its use is an endeavor to fabricate order if
one is unable to legitimately define it.
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B. PSYCHOHISTORY
Psychohi story differs from history as a discipline in the
respect that history is a narrative which tells what happened,
while psychohistory focuses on why it happened. Psychohistory
is somewhat of a marriage of history with psychology and
anthropology. It looks for correlations between events, or
behaviors, and human motivations.
Two main divisions of psychohistory are psychobiography
and group psychohistory. As their names imply, the former
division looks at events in a person's life and times which
formed his or her particular perspectives, while the latter
division looks at patterns in society as a whole. Since this
thesis is theoretical it has been necessary to omit lengthy
case studies or focusing on individuals. Although the two
divisions are intricately interrelated, the focus of this
section will be on group psychohistory.
In order to deal with events, as opposed to understanding
them, they are classified as things which have both a definite
beginning and a definite end. Wars and revolutions are prime
examples. Neither one ever begins spontaneously, nor is their
fervor satisfied on the date of resolution. The process of
considering abstracts as if they were physical objects can be
extended to ideas about historical events. "Events like wars,
economic changes (e.g., the Industrial Revolution), nations,
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artistic movements are all talked about as if they were
substances concealed behind external appearances." 63
Societies evolve in a kind of Maslowvian hierarchy.
However, evolution denotes change, not necessarily progress.
If a given society's primary concern is survival against
attack from outside of the group, then it may pride itself in
community cohesiveness and growth. If another society's focus
is on its inability to provide subsistence and other basic
needs, then it may not hold high regard for human life--and
other such civilized notions. "The socioeconomic structure of
a society molds the social character of its members so that
they wish to do what they have to do." 64
An example of this is infanticide. Infanticide is
considered by many Westerners to be a barbaric method of
population control practiced only by "backward" Far Eastern
cultures and Aborigines. However, noted historian William L.
Langer reports that both infanticide and exposure were
actually widely accepted among most Western societies
throughout the nineteenth century. In fact, it was 1938 when
Parliament enacted the Infanticide Act. 65
63 Boas, George, The History of Ideas , (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), 33.
64 Fromm, Erich, To Have Or To Be?
,
(New York: Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc., 1976), 133.
Langer, in de Mause, Lloyd, ed., The New
Psychohistory
, (New York: The Psychohistory Press, 1975),
55-60.
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The acceptance of infanticide alternately grew or waned
over the centuries depending on socioeconomic needs of the
time and location. For example, as the population of the
declining Roman Empire suffered from epidemics, famine, and
invasion there was no need to limit population growth. Quite
the contrary, an increase in population was desired. This
affected people's perspectives on the value of life, etc.
Psychohistorians support the premise that various socio-
cultural periods greatly influence the psychological
development of members of that culture. A prime example in
near recent history is the era of the Victorian family. The
taboos which were dominant during this period are attributed
with contributing many social and medical myths and neuroses
to society. These ideas in turn greatly affected the
perspectives of the people involved.
If such premises are correct, then studying biographical
factors interspersed within socio-cultural periods may be
useful for understanding why someone believes certain ideas.
It may also shed light on how certain ideas gain prominence.
This would be especially true if particular psychological type
could be correlated with certain ideas within some socio-
cultural period. "And if there are psychological types with
which typical ideas are correlated, and if in a period there
is a predominant number of a given psychological type, then,
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of course, the appropriate ideas will circulate at that
time. " 66
One must be careful though to avoid the dangers of
falling, along with game theorists, into the trap of narrowly-
defined generalizations. However, it is necessary to look at
all the pieces if one is to see the completed puzzle, or big
picture, in the formation of perspectives.
66 Boas, 1969, 163.
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C. HISTORICISM AND IDEAS
Historicism is a philosophical term for the doctrine of
regarding established truths of religion and philosophy as
rooted in culture and historical situations. "The doctrine
that all ideas are situated in historical epochs, that this
value and truth are not eternal but relative to specific
historical contexts, has been named 'historicism.'" 67 It is
not the intention here to debate whether ideas, values or
truths are time/culture-bound or eternal constants. The
intention of this section is to show that different ideas,
etc. gain or lose popularity during different periods of time.
The degree of popularity has a great impact on the way people
develop perceptions.
It will be shown in the chapter on cognitive constructs
that people need perspectives in order to understand
situations. As Fackenheim, asserts, they also require
"timeless truths and values" on which to base their action.
"Yet the perspectives which he finds often merely reflect his
age; and what he accepts as timelessly true and valid is apt
to be merely the opinion which is in fashion." 68
History is arranged to make time conform to some
retrospective order. Thus after its occurrence, history is
67 Deininger, 1965, 289
68 Fackenheim, Emil L., Metaphysics and Historicity ,
Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961, 1.
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segmented into centuries, eras or ages, epochs, periods, etc.
to categorize ideas and their resultant events. Some examples
of this are: the dark ages, the renaissance period, and the
reformation.
From a macro viewpoint we can say that it is natural for
certain ideas to be popular during particular time periods due
to historical influences and current circumstances. Events
strongly influence the ideas of man, which in turn influence
man's action and create other events. A look in any book of
philosophical history will prove this circular concept to be
obvious. 69 Life can in some ways be compared with the
popular children's role-playing game "Dungeons and Dragons" in
which each event has various unknown outcomes independently
determined by each player's action. Each outcome provides
further challenges with unknown results. "Every shift in the
course of events changes the bearing of the past upon the
present . " 70
One can only wonder what outcome the Russian Revolution of
1917 would have produced if Lenin had no role to play. Would
Europe, and indeed the world, have been so ravaged by violence
if the Allies had stood up to Hitler before his aggression
developed into World War Two? What if Truman had not taken a
69 For examples see: Zoll, Donald. Reason and Rebellion ,
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963.
70 Lamprecht , S. P., Nature and History
,
(New York:
Columbia University Press, 1949), 71.
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strong stand against the communist invasion of Korea? What if
the United States had allowed strategic nuclear weapons to be
set up in Cuba? The "what ifs" could go on and on and still
the only logical answer is that the world would be different
from what it is today.
History abounds with examples of discontented philosophers
rebelling against the world as they know it. From such people
have come ideas which have reshaped the world. Following is
a list of only some of the people and their basic ideas which
have altered the foundations of the social/political world.
Martin Luther - reform, emerging middle class.
Rousseau - nature of man is good and peaceful, political
order is unnatural, private property corrupts, inequality
is immoral.
Hume - denial of natural law based on causality, advocated
self interest, morals as emotionally constructed
attitudes
.
Locke - rational self interest, government by consent,
individual rights based on natural law and experience.
Calvin - Protestant work ethic (which helped the middle
class emerge and further develop capitalism)
.
Hegel - dialectic nature of reality.
Marx - alienation with industry, value is labor, dialectic
materialism leading to communism.
Hobbes - social philosophy based on metaphysics and
psychology, denial of natural laws.
Machiavelli - ethics of glory, impact on fascism.
Bentham - ethics of utilitarianism, majority will as
standard for judgement of right and wrong.
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Each person, at least in some part, is shaped by the era
or period of time in which he or she lives. However, it is
important to note that the effect may be either to agree or to
disagree with the prominent ideas which are expressed. In
addition, the intensity of agreement or disagreement will vary
individually. Usually, personal views of ideology or
philosophy are a result of "reacting to" as opposed to "acting
with" them. An example of this would be the way the United
States' founding fathers responded positively the ideas of
John Locke while finding "repugnant the Calvinist reiteration
of the evil in man." 71
Some of the ideas which have affected mankind were listed
earlier in this section. Here will be considered some of the
reasons why people might react favorably to such stimuli.
"Probably one of the strongest factors for making such
receptivity is one's admiration for the people who hold an
idea rather than for the idea itself." 12 (emphasis added).
This statement is just as valid at a group level as it is at
an individual level. If true, it indicates that perspectives,
and indeed decisions as well, may be more determined by
influences than they are by information.
71 Feuer, Lewis S. Ideology and the Ideologists , (New
York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975), 62.
72 Boas, 1969, 64.
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It has long been held that most people are social
creatures. Membership in a group often causes one to identify
with ideas of the group. Thus one may agree in principle with
some organization without agreeing with specific issues put
forth by individual members. However, the more prominent the
member exhorting the specific idea, the more generally will
the idea be accepted by other group members.
The particular prestige of an organization extends to its
programs, policies and ideas. People tend to accept the ideas
of an organization or group whose prestige is high. In an
academic environment, for example, the more prestigious a
professor's reputation, the more easily accepted are his or
her ideas. This bears out regardless of how new or remote the
ideas are to socially accepted norms.
It is important to note that the authority invested in an
idea of£en helps determine its acceptability. Eric Fromm
tells us that when the survival of the group was based on
hunting, then competence was the basis of authority. However,
when social groups evolved into social hierarchies, the
necessity for competence gave way to social status. Thus
authority, and assumed competence, became invested in the
title of the person or group in charge. It is this assumed
competence that lends credibility and acceptance to the given
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ideas. This may cause people to become "blinded to reality by
the fiction they believe." 73
Another way authority, and thus permanence, is invested in
ideas is through institutions. Institutions, especially
religious ones, play a large role in the formation and
perpetuation of ideas.
In studying the history of ideas, it is essential to
distinguish those which are incorporated in institutions,
and therefore change slowly, from those which are the
opinions of individual persons and are transmitted from
man to man, and change more rapidly ... .All this suggests
that when an idea is adopted by a group and put into
practice, as in a church or state, it rate of change will
be slow. 74
Finally, it must be said that group acceptance, including
its ideas, promotes stability. Group stability promotes
preservation. Self-preservation is an extremely strong motive
for human behavior. So self-preservation is a function of
group stability, and stability depends on the unification of
the group
.
The unification of the group is cemented with the ideas
which it holds. "But since its stability will depend upon its
unity, and since its unity will be largely, if not entirely,
a matter of ideals, a society will incorporate an idea which
it will also express in the form of an idea." 75. It is
natural to accept the ideas of the group to which one belongs.
73 Fromm, 1976, 36-39.
74 Boas, 1969, 130-131.
75 Ibid. , 133.
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This chapter looked at how history affects perspectives.
It was decided that the subject of history holds relevance to
the formation of perspectives because it pertains to man's
relation to the world that surrounds him. This continued the
line of thinking which was proposed in the previous chapter
regarding the "Encapsulated Man Theory."
Three viewpoints concerning history were presented. They
were: historical analogies, psychohistory , and historicism.
In this section it was shown that historical analogies may be
used to gain or thwart support for some political or military
action. Historical analogies were viewed as a form of
emotional support for opinions and as justification for
policies not fully grounded with facts. Understanding one's
views concerning historical events and analogies is important
to comprehending their perspectives on the subject.
Psychohistory searches for correlations between historical
events and human motivation. It focuses on why some
particular event occurred. The example of infanticide was
used to demonstrate how socio-cultural evolution influences
ideas and perceptions.
The doctrine that truth is not a constant, but changes
according to the whims of society in relation to history is
called historicism. This section of the chapter showed how
that as different ideas, gain or lose popularity the
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perspectives held during that period will change as well. It
is natural for certain ideas to be popular during particular
time periods due to historical influences and other
circumstances
.
In this section a list was presented of some of the people
and their basic ideas which have altered the foundations of
the social/political world. Several reasons for why someone
might favorably react to ideas were also presented. It was
claimed that each person is shaped, in some manner, by the
prominent ideas of the period of time in which he or she
lives. The result may be an acceptance or rejection of the
ideas. Whichever is the case, the ideas have a dominant
effect on how one perceives reality.
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NATIONAL CHARACTER AND INDIVIDUAL PERSONALITIES
The spirit of a nation is assumed to be something
permanent embedded in the nation' s many changes.
--George Boas, The History of Ideas
Now the only defense that any nation can have is the
character and intelligence of its people.
--Robert M. Hut chins , ed. The Great Conversation
This chapter combines and expands on the concepts presented
in chapters IV and V. It further develops the part which
culture plays in developing perspectives. Section A begins by
exploring the concept of universal traits and their possible
effect on perspectives.
Next it looks at claims of how modal personality, or
national character, may be affected by a community's form of
subsistence. It is essential to bear in mind that such
theories may have more relevance to cultures which developed
without the benefit of global communications or
intercontinental transportation.
Section A also considers self -perpetuation as a motivator
at the national level. This is one basis for establishing
customs and developing traits. When coupled with the desire
to be understood and the need to associate with similar
people, self -perpetuation becomes a driver of national
character.
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Section B takes a brief view of individual personality
development. "Although once considered to be highly-
controversial, the major dimensions of personality are now
known to show moderate heritability .
"
76 Biological
approaches aside, this section focuses on socialization and
its effect on personality. Where the first Section talked
about means of subsistence developing modal personality types
in immature cultures, Section B alludes that the reverse may
be true in modern, transient societies.
76 Buss, David M., "Toward a Biologically Informed
Psychology of Personality," Journal of Personality , 58:1,
March 19 90, 4.
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A. NATIONAL CHARACTER
"Many psychologists believe that certain universal
psychological traits link all humans." 77 This belief stems
from everyone sharing certain universal experiences like birth
and physiological development, and extremes of sensory stimuli
such as hot and cold, light and dark, etc. If it is true that
these types of experiences at least partially shape our
personality traits, then it must also be true that the way our
culture treats these events help to develop a national
character. This, in part, leads some people to think that
it's "just human nature" to perceive things the same way they
themselves perceive them.
Anthropologists claim to have observed patterns of
societal characteristics which were dependent on the type of
subsistence the group had. Some researchers have found strong
character differences between societies which are pastoral as
opposed to ones that are herdsmen. Still others have found
groups which stock up their food (both herdsmen and farmers)
tend to be a more cohesive group, dependent upon each other,
and patient, as opposed to groups like city dwellers who
forage for their subsistence and live from day to day. The
latter group tends to be more impulsive and aggressive. To
what degree the present interdependence of nations may alter
77 Kottak, Conrad, Cultural Anthropology , 2nd ed., (New
York: Random House, Inc., 1979), 213.
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these assumptions is not known. Nor is it known to what
extent genetics may influence the distribution of such traits.
It is also important to note there is not universal agreement
on this subject. "At the present stage of theory and
research, in the social sciences at least, individual
variation is not reducible to or subsumable under the heading
of cultural patterns." 78
"The character of each individual is unique, for one
individual's experiences never match those of another, nor is
it probable that the constitutional components of any two
persons are exactly identical." 79 Genetics, early
imprinting, and role models may all play important parts in
developing individual character and personality.
Early experiences in the womb would be unique to each
individual, yet may be important in the development of affect
and personality. Medical studies suggest that ingestion of
drugs, alcohol and tobacco by a pregnant woman causes birth
defects. They probably have an effect on the development of
neural connections in the unborn child as well. This may
influence the child's cognitive schemata, and thus how he or
she groups and stores images, experiences, patterns of
thought, etc. Each of these items later affect how the person
78 Press and Arian, 63.
79 Shapiro, Harry, ed., Man, Culture, and Society ,
revised edition, (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University
Press, 1971), 220.
69
perceives new phenomena. Although logical assumptions can be
made in this area, it is difficult, if not impossible at the
present time, to empirically test such assumptions.
It has been observed elsewhere in this thesis that self-
preservation is a keen motivator of human behavior. The
desire for self -perpetuation is nearly synonymous with this
type of motivation. This desire is coupled with the need to
be understood, and thus with the need for association with
people of similar background, beliefs and experiences.
Multiply these needs by the people that make the particular
social group and apply this factor to the generations of
shared commonality and it equates to national character.
People tend to perpetuate the particular customs and ideas
which they or their ancestors originated. When the customs,
ideas or traits are shared by a large group or nation then
this perpetuation becomes the basis of national character.
People everywhere seem to be more interested with identity
than with world unity. Reinhold Niebuhr commented on the
relationships of individuals and the community as expressed
through social experience.
The individual and the community are related to each other
on many levels. The highest reaches of individual
consciousness and awareness are rooted in social
experience and find their ultimate meaning in relation to
the community. 80
80 Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Children of Light and The
Children of Darkness
,
(Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), 50.
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Charles Manning has observed that the identity which
people seek often affects their perspectives. One way this is
accomplished is in the manner of "The enemy of my friend is my
enemy too .
"
However autonomous in principle, man does indeed relate
his living to that of other men. Men think, judge, behave
in relation with their like. . . .If A's associates think one
way and B's another, A and B will be predisposed, almost
as by iron necessity, to differ. 81
For nations, self -perpetuation becomes the foundation of
nationalism and national interests. Nationalism is an
expression of national character and has become increasingly
a dominant motivator world wide. "What makes of nationalism
a social force is the fact that people feel it, and are moved
by it to do things." 82 The national interests of a state
generally reflect the state's relative standing with respect
to its hierarchy of needs. The hierarchy is based on a
continuum from survival to comfort and leisure. In order to
understand a country's national interests one must look at
that nation's culture, tradition and history. This is what
determines the national character of a nation's people.
81 Manning, Charles A. W. , The Nature of International




Berger and Luckmann speak of "significant others" which
have a direct role in a person's primary socialization. These
are one's parents or other people with whom one encounters
early in their lives that are "in charge of his [or her]
socialization." These significant others define one's view of
objective reality through the concepts of the "Encapsulated
Man Theory" (see chapter III). "They select aspects of it in
accordance with their own location in the social structure,
and also by virtue of their individual, biographically rooted
idiosyncrasies." 83 The ease or difficulty with which they
obtain their subsistence may have a bearing on developing
personalities and on perspectives as well.
As already noted, anthropologists have observed that
various cultures in the same geographic area have different
modal personality types, or character, according to their mode
of subsistence. In countries, like the United States, which
have a diverse spread of socio-economic possibilities the
reverse may be true. People may locate themselves socially or
geographically according to their basic personality type.
This is not to say that all farmers are of one personality
83 Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann, The Social
Construction of Reality: A Treatise In The Sociology Of
Knowledge
,
(New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966), 120-
121.
72
type and only associate with other farmers, nor that all
professional people are of one personality type and associate
only with other professions, etc. However, there is evidence
to indicate that one's means of subsistence is a strong form
of group identification and that people tend to associate
themselves with like people.
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C. SUMMARY
Psychoanalyst Abram Kardiner "asserted that a basic
personality structure typifies the members of a given
society." 84 This structure is a patterned way of doing
things which Kardiner calls "cultural institutions," and
includes patterns of subsistence, child care, feeding, family
organization, rituals, religion, myths, etc. Kardiner argued
that although these patterns vary from one culture to another,
they operate with sufficient uniformity within a given
culture. He claims this uniformity is responsible for
developing similar psychological traits in all members of a
given society.
Culture may tend to mold modal personality types, or
national character, but people develop unique personalities
according to their individual experiences in contact with the
physical and social world. "Each man is a common type, molded
by culture and society, and yet possessed of individuality
that culture cannot submerge." 85.
All of this taken together tends to indicate that there
are no universal attributes of human nature. The common
experiences which people seem to share (such as birth, child
care, adolescence, old age, etc) are all approached
84 Kottak, 1979, 217.
85 Shapiro, 1971, 222
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differently in various cultures. People's actions/reactions
and beliefs are molded and bounded by the culture in which
they live. "The individual is the product of the whole socio-
historical process, though he may reach a height of uniqueness
which seems to transcend his social history completely." 86
National character, or a culture's modal personality, thus
tend to affect both group and individual perceptual
predispositions. "Since all persons in a given culture have
some similar experiences and some unique experiences, we may
expect that any given individual will have some communal
perceptual predispositions and some very unique perceptual
predispositions." 87 The reader should be cautioned however,
that strategic errors in judgement have been made by placing
too much stock in generalities.
86 Niebuhr, 1960, 50
87 West, 1981, 36.
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VI. DEVELOPMENT OF COGNITIVE CONSTRUCTS
There has been much psychological research to support the
idea that previously learned concepts greatly influence how
people perceive new stimuli. They also affect how people
structure problems and formulate solutions. A person's
experience and conceptual knowledge has a keen role in
establishing expectations. "Previously learned concepts
influence the ways a person senses, perceives, and thinks
about new phenomena." 88
Once a concept or belief is formed, it is hard to change,
even when presented convincing factual information which
contradicts the existing belief. People tend to pay attention
to information which supports their beliefs and ignore
information which seems to disagree with their beliefs. There
is never perfect information. Information is always tempered




People assign positive qualities to nations they like and
negative qualities to nations they dislike. In this way
people often believe that close allies, especially countries
with similar people like UK and US, will mutually support the
same goals, whereas the policies of "enemies" are perceived
designed to be harmful or not supportive of the same goals.
We tend to believe that countries we like do things we
like, support goals we favor, and oppose countries
that we oppose. We tend to think that countries that
are our enemies make proposals that would harm us,
work against us, work against the interests of our
friends, and aid our opponents. 89
Another way of saying the same thing is that people believe
what they want to believe. People want to believe the world
is an orderly, understandable environment. To ensure that it
is a way they can understand, they assign attributes according
to association with familiar experiences.
This evaluation process, or the making of inferences, is
natural and indeed necessary when classifying or categorizing
new stimuli. "The misevaluation arises when we act as if our
inferential knowledge were factual knowledge." 90 If this is
true, then the questions become whether or not people always
know what they want to believe, and how their beliefs are
89 Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in
International Politics , (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1976), 117-118.
90 Weinberg, 1959, 20.
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formed. Some decisions may be internally arrived at before
they are consciously considered.
Once some particular belief is established, it is often
difficult to change. This is especially true if a person's
values are involved. "We ignore information that does not
fit, twist it so that it confirms, or at least does not
contradict, our beliefs, and deny its validity." 91
Associating one's beliefs and values in a way which makes
personal sense out of reality establishes the roots of one's
formal system of norms. This results in attaching strong
emotional defense mechanisms to these formal norms. It is
easy to agree with Hall that attacking such norms may bring
disastrous results.
Whenever violations of formal norms occur, they are
accompanied by a tide of emotion. One can get an idea of
how people feel about formal systems by thinking of a
person who has been supported all his life by a very
strong prop. Remove the prop and you shake the
foundations of life. Deep emotions are associated with
the formal in almost every instance. 92
An example of this is how one may feel a personal affront when
their religious beliefs are criticized. Ways of behavior
which are foreign to one's formal norms may be thought of as
unnatural or impossible.
Most people are familiar with the saying: "First
impressions are lasting impressions." It has been shown
91 Jervis, 1976, 143
92 Hall, 1959, 97.
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earlier in this thesis that the same is true for perspectives
and beliefs. Once established, not only are they difficult to
change but the mind may actually search for evidence to
support the belief. This is true even if the actual facts do
not support the predetermined conclusions.
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B. STRESS AND ANXIETY
There is a large amount of supportive literature that
indicates stress is a factor in the perception of relevant
information. Some researchers claim that stress routinely
sharpen the intellect while others say it detracts from one's
ability to be effective. Pneuman and Bruehl assert that the
level of the resultant anxiety is the determining factor of
stress. "One could tentatively conclude that either high or
low extremes of anxiety are associated with lower performance
than are more moderate levels of anxiety." 93 They further
found that moderate levels of anxiety tends to promote
performance
.
Holsti agrees with these findings. He writes: "There is
also some evidence that persons experiencing intense stress
tend to suffer increased cognitive rigidity, an erosion of
general cognitive abilities, including creativity and the
ability to cope with complexity." 94 This often leads the
decision-maker to fall back on stereotypical correlations. He
or she may establish a dominant percept with which to
interpret new information. This percept is often borrowed
from a similar situation or a lesson of history and is based
on what the decision-maker expects to discover.
93 Pneuman and Bruehl, 19 82, 39.
94 Holsti, in Tetlock, et al , 1989, 30
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As the stress increases so might the resistance to
pressure. At some point the desire to relieve the stress-
related pressure may cause one's priorities to shift or even
an inability for effective decision making. In recalling the
Cuban missile crisis and the stress experienced by the
president and his advisors, Robert Kennedy wrote:
That kind of pressure does strange thing to a human being,
even to brilliant, self-confident, mature, experienced
men. For some it brings out characteristics and strengths
that perhaps they never knew they had, and for others the
pressure is too overwhelming. 95
There is not sufficient evidence to know if it is
primarily the amount of stress that is important. That is,
would equivalent results be obtain from applying the same
amount of stress across a population sample? It is more
likely that varying degrees of stress affect different people
in varying ways. Furthermore, it is logical to assume that
one becomes tempered or accustomed to operating in stressful
environments and thus able to do so effectively.




C. VALUES AND BELIEF SYSTEMS
By the time we have reached adulthood we have tens
possibly hundreds of thousands of beliefs concerning what
is or is not true and beautiful and good about the
physical and social world in which we live.
--Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes and Values
This thesis does not deal specifically with the degree to
which values, beliefs, concepts, etc. are interrelated, only
with the fact that they are interrelated and thus affect the
formation of perspectives and the outcome of any decision.
Values may be considered as something with enduring qualities.
The concept of value, as used here, is that of something
abstract which is generally considered worthy of being sought
after.
Beliefs are anything which could fit into the sentence:
"I believe ...." It has been shown throughout this thesis
that some beliefs, much like perspectives, change over time.
The amount of change and the effect of the change depend on
how central the belief is to one's formal belief system. "The
more central a belief, the more it will resist change ... [and]
the more central the belief changed, the more widespread the
repercussions in the rest of the belief system." 96
96 Rokeach, Milton, Beliefs, Attitudes and Values , (San
Francisco, Washington and London: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1972), 3.




The centrality of the particular belief is a function of
how the belief was derived. Beliefs obtained during the
process of primary socialization are the most central. They
are the most difficult to alter, the results of which may be
disastrous. Such beliefs are give one their concept of a
stable, dependable world and may include a wide range of
beliefs. These are the "basic truths" which someone may
regard as "objective reality."
For example, at some early point in a person's life it
becomes second nature to expect the floor to be beneath their
feet when they get out of bed. Beliefs of this type are often
thought of as instinct, however evidence indicates they are
learned behavior akin to finding one's mouth without guidance
when one is eating. Imagine the dissonance which would be
caused if one suddenly discovered they could no longer trust
the floor to be where they expected.
Rokeach refers to these most central beliefs as "primitive
beliefs" with a taken-for-granted constancy. Similar to
Hall's analogy of a prop which holds someone up, (see Section
A) Rokeach states that disruption of these beliefs may well
cause one to question their ability to cope with reality.
"Put another way, violation of any primitive beliefs supported
by unanimous consensus may lead to serious disruption of
beliefs about self-constancy or self -identity , and from this
disruption other disturbances should follow, for example,
disturbance in one's feelings of competence and
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ef f ectance; . . . it would lead one to question the validity of
many other beliefs within one's belief system; it would
produce a great deal of inconsistency within the belief
system, that, to eliminate, would require major cognitive
reorganization in the content and in the structural relations
among many other beliefs within the system.
"
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Other examples of central beliefs are concepts of family,
parental roles, and the concept of one's own self. These
types of beliefs help provide order in a person's life. When
they are disturbed, or when one is caused to seriously
question them, they may result in a complete upheaval of the
person's psyche.
Belief in the credibility of an authority is considered a
"derived belief" because it implies acceptance of other
beliefs concerning the authority. This gives validity to an
authority figure due to the office or position they hold.
These beliefs have obvious implication regarding political,
civil, and social arrangements. They also include ideological
and religious beliefs. One expects these beliefs to remain
constant, but the results of change would probably not be as
disastrous as would changing more centrally held beliefs.
The more congruent a belief or system of beliefs is to
one's own belief system, the more easily it is to accept. The
person who exhibits beliefs similar to one's own beliefs will
97 Ibid., 7.
84
be valued, and his or her ideas and information are more
readily accepted as truth. The reverse is true regarding
people exhibiting beliefs which are foreign to one's own. The
information which they provide will often be questioned and be
difficult to accept as factual.
Belief systems form the core or base of a person's
cognitive schemata or structure. Like a matching game, they
provide a standard for comparing new stimuli and for
developing perspectives. Consistency of the structure is
essential to maintaining order in one's life. "This
consistency is another source of stability and resistance to
change." 98 When one loses faith in their beliefs, especially
the most central ones, their cognitive structure becomes
disorganized and they may question their perspectives on
reality.
98 Pneuman and Bruehl , 1982, 42
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D. SUMMARY
This chapter has looked at the development of cognitive
constructs. It stressed the idea that previously learned
concepts have a great influence on how people perceive new
stimuli. These concepts and beliefs also affect the way-
people structure problems and formulate solutions. "How they
'understand' events is a function of their beliefs about human
nature, motivation, institutions, and the like." 99
People tend to accept information which supports their
beliefs and to discount information which is incongruent with
their own beliefs. Once a concept or belief is formed, it is
hard to change. This is true even when presented factual
information which contradicts the existing belief.
Section A discussed inferences. Inferences are based on
association of the new information with prior knowledge. They
can also be formed through accepting the beliefs of someone
with whom one identifies. It was noted that it is not wrong
to make inferences, but one should realizes that the
information derived from them is not always factual.
The next section discussed the effect of stress and
anxiety on the decision-maker. "Emotional and valuational
factors may override logic." 100 It was shown that the effect
99 Deininger, 1965, 319.
100 Pneuman and Bruehl, 1982, 49
86
of stress generally equates to the amount of stress, the
ability of the decision-maker to handle stress, and the
experience of operating under stress. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to determine unilaterally how stress will affect
people. However, several researchers have found that moderate
levels tend to promote performance while extremely low or high
levels of stress can be associated with low performance.
Section C talked about values and belief systems. It was
shown that the importance of beliefs depend on how centrally
they are located in one's belief system. Some beliefs are so
essential that determining they are false or inaccurate may
entirely disrupt a person's life.
The manner in which information is structured within a
person's cognitive schemata is important to how they
understand and accept new information.
Apparently, when a person encounters an ambiguous array of
potential information, the tendency is to impose some
structured meaning from previous experience on it, and the
person is then unwilling to surrender these. These
structures inhibit accurate recognition when they are in
error. This is clearly a from of resistance to change
which can impede learning. 101
"Finally, complex problems are more likely to be defined
by the decision maker's beliefs, expectations, and cognitive
and emotional predispositions than by the 'objective'
attributes of the situation." 102 This is one of the most
101 West, 1981, 34-35.
102 Holsti, in Tetlock, et al . , 1989, 33.
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essential concepts to understand when one is studying how
perspectives are formed, and the influence they have on
decisions which are made. Subjectivity is the key throughout.
VII. MODELING THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Before I begin to explain to you in a general way what
this system is about . . . I want particularly to impress on
your mind that the most important ideas and principles of
the system do not belong to me. This is chiefly what
makes them valuable, because if they belonged to me they
would be like all other theories invented by ordinary
minds--they would give only a subjective view of them.
--P. D. Ouspensky, The Fourth Way .
This chapter is about modeling the decision-maker's
perspectives. It is important to note that this thesis deals
with descriptive theories, not predictive theories. This
chapter presents modeling the process of forming perspectives
which is closely aligned with models of short-term and long-
term memory
.
The models build on the Encapsulated Man theory using
information presented throughout the thesis. The intent is to
bring together the various concepts into the "big picture" of
the process of decision-making. The thesis was designed to
facilitate understanding the development of perspectives, and
thus ultimately the decision-making process. Likewise, the
models which are presented here are intended to help
understand the process leading to the decision, not to predict
what decision might be made.
89
A. MEMORY ACTIVATION
As with most models concerning decision-making, the
approach taken in this thesis closely follows models relating
to associative memory theory. The model presented here also
borrows from interactive activation competition theory and
constraint satisfaction network theory. 103
The basic premise of both the interactive activation
competition theory and constraint satisfaction network theory
is that the mind does not solve problems in a serial fashion
using discreet steps. Instead, memory is accessed in a
parallel distributed process across several (if not many)
layers of brain cells simultaneously. Each unit (roughly
analogous to neurons in models of the brain) is connected to
many other units which, in turn are connected to many other
units, etc.
When a unit is activated by external stimuli it will
improve or degrade the activation of units to which it is
connected. These units will then improve or degrade the
activations of units with which they are connected, and so the
103 For further information see: Rumelhart, David E.,
James L. McClelland, and the PDP Research Group, Parallel
Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of
Cognition, Vol 1: Foundations , Cambridge: The MIT Press,
1986, 43-193; and McClelland, James L
.
, David E. Rumelhart,
and the PDP Research Group, Parallel Distributed Processing:
Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, Vol 2:
Psychological and Biological Models , Cambridge: The MIT
Press, 1986, 8-121.
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process continues. Although there are different theories as
to the how and why of the activation of the connections, the
approach presented here is that similar units will improve
activation and dissimilar units will degrade activation. In
Figure 4, unit "A" is directly connected to units: n B", "C",
"E", "G n and "H" by some prior event or series of events. The
units other than "A" are interconnected as represented by the
lines. The small "s" and " d" represent whether these
connections are similar or dissimilar. (A type "s n connected
Figure 4 Example of Unit Activations
91
to a type "d" or a type "d" connected to a type "s" is
considered dissimilar ("-" or negative correlation), while a
type "s" connected to another type "s" or a type "d" connected
to another type "d" is considered similar ("+" or positive
correlation) ) . It is apparent that unit "B" has dissimilar
connections with units: "D" "G" and "I", while unit "C" has
dissimilar connections with units: "E" and "F", and similar
connections with unit "D"
.
Assume that the weighting of each of the connections is
considered to be equal, with each one representing a positive
or negative unitary measurement. (The units directly
connected from unit "A" are considered similar, thus
accounting for the initial connection with the unit receiving
external stimulus) . The effect of the activation can be
determined by an algebraic summation of each unit. If the
activation threshold is assumed to be +1, so that no one unit
is turned on unless it has achieved or exceeded a sum of +1,
then units: "C" , n E", "G", "H" and "I" are activated in this
particular case. The results of the summation are presented
in Table 1.
Units may be considered as similar even if there is no
apparently logical correlation as long as the concepts which
the units represent were experienced together. For example,
suppose a young boy experienced fear when a small dog yipped
at him. He may again experience the same emotion as an adult
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when he sees a small dog in a pet store window, while feeling
love or comfort towards a larger dog in the same scenario.
As an example of how this might work with physical objects
consider a person blindfolded and given the conceptual
representation of a chair in some of the places one may see or
otherwise experience chairs. The different places may
include: living room, kitchen, dining room, bedroom, office,
or classroom, etc. Now add to the scenario the sound of a
TABLE 1. Activation of Units in Figure 1
UNIT ACTIVATION SUMMATION
B + - - - -2
C + + - + 1
D + + -- + -- -1
E + - + + + 2
F - -1
G + - + + + 2
H + + - + 1
I - + + + 1
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radio softly playing in the background. At this point one may
begin to automatically rank the probabilities pertaining to
the actual place.
If the sound of a ringing telephone is added, then one
would probably greatly decrease the activation of "classroom"
while increasing the activation of other units. (In reality,
even the act of considering the prioritization will greatly
reinforce the perception that the highest ranking place is the
correct one) . If told there is a large table in the room,
then one would probably further rule out living room and
bedroom.
Smelling the aroma of a sauce simmering and feeling heat
radiating from the general direction of the aroma, one is
liable to assume he or she is in a kitchen near a stove. How
surprised the person would be to discover he or she is
actually in a dining room with a fondue set on the table and
the heater mistakenly turned on.
This example is a simplistic representation of the process
of perspective formation. Yet all perspectives experience
influences in a similar fashion. This is true whether the
perspectives are sensory objects, idealistic or value-based
concepts, or attempts to determine an opponent's intentions.
Current studies involving the neurophysiological
functioning of the brain indicate that cognition is not
compartmentalized. It may depend upon the interactive
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competition of neurons. This competition is greatly
influenced by a variable neural firing rate and the
associativity of neural connections.
This means that the previous modeling practice of
isolating and focusing on only the "most relevant factors" 104
may result in gross inaccuracy. Factors considered irrelevant
may actually have great relevance, depending on the situation.
104 For further reading on this subject the reader is




Jean Piaget has described the process of perspective
development in adolescents and small children. 105 The
present section of this thesis will concentrate on modeling
the process of developing perspectives in the adult decision-
maker. This represents no intention to model the neural
functions of the brain. Nor does it claim to represent the
precise manner in which specific actions take place. This
would require much more rigorous research than science is
currently capable. The model presented here represents a
general theoretical approach to the formation of perspectives
based on the concepts and ideas developed throughout the
thesis
.
Figure 5 depicts the basic model and shows four domains or
areas wherein conceptual development or influences take place.
It is essential to understand that domains all overlap each
other. This is not hierarchically structured model, thus the
areas are called "domains" and not "levels." Collectively,
these domains are the internal representations of the
"Encapsulated Man Theory" from chapter III. Outside of the
domains exist what might be called "objective events."
105 Although most of Piaget 's work concerns this topic,
two of his more notable and easily discernable books are: The
Mechanisms of Perception
,
(London: Rout ledge & Kegan Paul,
1969), and Psychology & Epistemoloqy : Towards a Theory of
Knowledge
,
(New York: Grossman Publishers, 1971).
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Within DOMAIN I are the person's value base and belief
system. As explained in the previous chapter, the more
central a person's belief, the more difficult it is to change







Figure 5 Basic Model of DOMAINS
Quite often this domain is fully developed at an early
age. Jesuit priests are accredited with claiming that if they
are given a child to teach and nurture until the age of five,
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then the child will be theirs for life. Philosophical and
religious literature alike abound with statements which make
similar claims. In this domain dwell the beliefs for which
people would rather "fight than switch." All other "domains"
and perspectives are structured on DOMAIN I.
As a child matures he or she learns through experience and
the use of intellect. This tempers the concepts in DOMAIN I,
and develops concepts in DOMAIN II through a functional
relationship with DOMAIN I. Authority beliefs and derived
beliefs exist in DOMAIN II. If the child discovers there is
no Santa Claus or alters his or her initial beliefs regarding
God or country then the revision would be worked out in this
area without shattering the foundations of the structure which
are located in DOMAIN I
.
The concepts in DOMAIN II largely depend on learning
experiences within the context of the person's social
structure. "They seem to serve the purpose of helping the
person to round out his picture of the world, realistically
and rationally to the extent possible, defensively and
irrationally to the extent necessary." 106 Although these
beliefs are resistent to change, they are more pliable than
ones in DOMAIN I
.
In DOMAIN III exists the person's physical and emotional
state of wellbeing. DOMAIN III acts like a filter which
106 Rokeach, 1972, 8.
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colors incoming stimuli in accordance with the person's
condition. This is where stress, anxiety, and emotions have
an opportunity to affect one's perception of new information.
There is evidence in the literature that one's physical
state affects the chemical balance in the brain. This, in
turn may alter the brain's electrical connections. This
determines which neurons are activated and which are inhibited
from activation. 107 An example of one way this works is the
rush of adrenaline one experiences when confronted with fear
or other sudden stress.
Within DOMAIN IV exists the actual perspectives. These,
as asserted throughout the thesis, are the result of the
formation of subjective events or the internal representation
of outside (objective) events. DOMAIN IV is where a person's
concept of reality resides.
Figure 6 represents the interactive functioning of the
processes described above. The oblong boxes which are in
DOMAINS I - III are the actual concepts with possible
activation levels ranging from least to most (or strong to
107 For a simplified explanation of this general process
see Section A. More in depth information may be found in the
following texts: Freeman, Walter, Neurobiology Review ,
(Berkeley: IEEE, Neural Network Committee, 1989); de
Callatay, Armand M., Natural and Artificial Intelligence:
Processor Systems Compared to the Human Brain , Amsterdam:
North-Holland, 1986); Kent, Ernest W., The Brains of Men and
Machines
, (Peterborough: BYTE/McGraw Hill, 1981); and Hart,
Leslie A., How the Brain Works: A New Understanding of Human
Learning, Emotion, and Thinking
,
(New York: Basic Books,
Inc., Publishers, 1975).
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weak, as may be appropriate) . As in the model from Section A,
it is significant to note that the history of activations is
as important as the context which causes them to be activated.
Thus, the more often some particular connection is activated,
the more likely it will be activated in similar situations.




Figure 6 Expanded Model of DOMAINS
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The outside events are signified by large letters enclosed
within rectangles. This assumes the existence of objective
reality as the standard around which each person forms their
view of reality and is the basis for interpersonal
communication. The path of their connections to the person's
perspectives is unidirectional from the outside inward to
DOMAIN IV. For example, information from "D" flows to "d n but
information does not flow from "d" to "D"
.
The same is true regarding the connections from DOMAIN I
to DOMAINS III and IV. They are unidirectional. The concepts
in DOMAINS II and IV will not alter the concepts in DOMAIN I.
However, all other connections between domains are
bidirectional. Perspectives from DOMAIN IV may alter concepts
in DOMAIN II or they may trigger emotions, etc. as well as be
influenced by other DOMAINS.
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C. SUMMARY
This chapter has presented three models regarding the
process of forming perspectives. The three models were
actually expanded views of each other, in varying degrees of
representation. The first model (Section A) was based on
theories of short-term and long-term memory. All three models
are constructed along neural network theories primarily
concerning Interactive Activation Competition and Constraint
Satisfaction. It is essential to remember that the history of
activations is as important as the context in which the
activations occurred.
The models built on the Encapsulated Man theory using
information presented throughout the thesis. The intent was
to bring together the various concepts into the "big picture"
of the process of forming perspectives. The thesis was
designed to facilitate understanding the development of
perspectives, and thus ultimately the decision-making process.
The models which were presented here are intended to help
understand the process leading to the decision, not to predict
what decision might be made.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Perspectives are extremely important in political
decision-making. This thesis has sought to show that the
study of decision-making must include studying how
perspectives are formed. This entails using an
interdisciplinary approach.
Too often the study of decision-making has been approached
in a segmented manner with social scientists each believing
their discipline is the correct approach. Psychologists and
psychiatrists feel the need to psychoanalyze the decision-
maker and attempt to discover what dark secrets may be hidden
in his or her mind. Sociologists look at the decision-maker's
social organization and his or her interactive information
processing. Political scientists conduct surveys or "re-fight
the last war." Game theorists search for the "most relevant"
information from which they can develop "rational" models.
This thesis looked at some of the factors which influence the
formation of perspectives, or mindsets, with the intention of
demonstrating the importance of integrating various
disciplines in the study of decision-making.
It was shown that several disciplines need be incorporated
to discover how various factors influence the decision-making
process. Proper research, at the minimum, involves studies in
political science, sociology, psychology, and philosophy.
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Each of these disciplines have diverse areas within in them
that apply to how perspectives are formed. While conducting
research for this thesis reviewing the biological processes of
the brain and theories regarding short-term and long-term
memory was extremely beneficial. Studying Artificial Neural
Networks from computer science was quite useful for
understanding how other researchers are trying to duplicate or
simulate functions of the human brain.
Perspectives are often confused with beliefs or ideas.
Many empirical studies involving perspectives pertain to
visual experiments and optical illusions. This thesis defined
perspectives as a subjective approach to an objective reality.
A large portion of various sections in the thesis was devoted
to examining concepts of subjective reality.
The thesis explored some of the possible
interrelationships of perceptual influences with the intent of
better understanding the decision-making process. While doing
so, it investigated the following five hypotheses:
• Reason and reality are concepts unique to each person and
probably change over time.
• Reason depends on the application of a person's
culture/customs to their epistemic development.
• Previously learned concepts greatly influence how people
perceive new stimuli and how people structure problems and
formulate solutions.
• Culture helps to shape perceptions by setting attitudes
and beliefs.
• Decisions may be determined more by influences than by
information.
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The thesis presented several models. The first model was
a two-dimensional model of political decision-making. On the
vertical plane was a continuum of levels ranging from "least
important" to "most important." Here it is determined who
must make the decision and the amount of attention devoted to
it. The horizontal level of decision-making ranges from logic
and rationalism to subjective emotionalism. Most decisions
are made somewhere between the two extremes.
The first part of the thesis also discussed problems with
game theory and examined how "laws" are actually only "points
of reference." It showed how even laws of physics are not
constant and change over time as scientist's perspectives
change. Reality was discussed in terms of subjectivity and
objectivity.
The thesis demonstrated that the "reason" in someone's
action is important for understanding that action. Questions
of "why" and "how" must be considered along with the "what" of
decisions. It is not enough to look for statistical
correlations or to perform a regression analysis and expect
future decisions to "fit the curve." That is, not is people
learn by mistakes (or any other event)
.
The thesis asserted that selective awareness is a problem
for all people. The filtering of one's awareness is often
accomplished unconsciously, and may be due to prior knowledge
or experiences. At times this process causes people to make
inferences which are not based on facts. The research
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indicated that even experience, once thought a commonality
with mankind, is subjective. No two people see or experience
the same thing.
The structure with which one's mind categorizes and stores
data greatly influences learning new information as well as
how previously stored information is retrieved. How a person
receives, perceives, stores and retrieves knowledge has a
great influence on his or her formation of concepts,
perceptions, and ultimately, decisions. No new situation is
ever approached tabula rasa.
How one perceives today depends on what one experienced
prior to today. Our minds apparently organizes data in a
manner with which it can compare new information. This thesis
suggested the concept of cognitive schemata by showing that
people structure artificial order because they cannot
comprehend chaos. This artificial order, or functional
reality, is a microcosm of reality.
The chapter on reality presented a theory of subjective
reality called the "Encapsulated Man Theory." It examined the
concept of Self and how one develops one's perceived reality.
Reason depends on the application of culture and custom to a
person's epistemic development. Reality is unique to each
individual. There are no universal laws, no constants
throughout time. As society changes, so do the behavioral




A reason expressed for why some people may not readily
accept the concept of subjective reality was the tendency to
believe that they actually see things in an objective sense.
Then, through the process of mirror-imaging, they attribute
the same perspectives to other people. Yet it was shown that
no two people can perceive reality in an identical way.
Reality, much like rationality, is a concept which is unique
to each individual
.
History was shown to affect perceptions in two important
ways. One way is how history is interpreted. Another way
history affects perspectives is through the culturally based
development of social standards and individual personalities.
History holds special relevance to the formation of
perspectives because it pertains to man's relation to the
world that surround him.
It was observed that self-preservation is a keen motivator
of human behavior. The desire for self -perpetuation was found
to be nearly synonymous with this type of motivation. This
desire is coupled with the need to be understood, and thus
with the need for association with people of similar
background, beliefs and experiences. Multiply these needs by
the people that make the particular social group and apply
this factor to the generations of shared commonality and it
equates to national character. National character, as a form




A person's experience and conceptual knowledge has a keen
role in establishing expectations. Once a concept or belief
is formed, it is hard to change, even when presented
convincing factual information which contradicts the existing
belief. People tend to pay attention to information which
supports their beliefs and ignore information which seems to
disagree with their beliefs. There is never perfect
information. Information is always tempered by internal
biases
.
A person's values and beliefs may form the strongest
influences on his or her perspectives. The importance of
one's beliefs and values depend on how centrally they are
located in one's belief system. Some beliefs are so essential
that determining they are false or inaccurate may have
disastrous effects on one's life.
There were three other models presented in the thesis
regarding the process of forming perspectives. The three
models were actually expanded views of each other, in varying
degrees of representation. The first model was based on
theories of short-term and long-term memory. All three models
are constructed along neural network theories primarily
concerning Interactive Activation Competition and Constraint
Satisfaction. It is essential to remember that the history of
activations is as important as the context in which the
activations occurred.
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The models built on the Encapsulated Man theory using
information presented throughout the thesis. The intent was
to bring together the various concepts into the "big picture"
of the process of forming perspectives. The thesis was
designed to facilitate understanding the development of
perspectives, and thus ultimately the decision-making process.
The models which were presented are intended to help
understand the process leading to the decision, not to predict
what decision might be made.
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